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VERBALIZATION OF PROBLEM-SOLVING BEHAVIOR
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
While awareness does not seem to be an appropriate 
concept in the description of the behavior of animals, the 
role of awcireness must be considered for an understanding 
of the learning processes of humans. Kanfer and Marston 
(1961) formulated the issue concisely: "Awareness can be
conceptualized as a mediating class of responses which 
controls learning of subsequent responses or as a coinci­
dental class of responses which only sometimes correlates 
with le Earning" (p. 463).
Unfortunately the word "awareness" has been opera­
tionally defined by various experimenters to serve the 
defense of their own biases. The result has been conflict­
ing conclusions based on conflicting definitions. No 
satisfactory resolution of the issue of the presence or 
absence of awareness in learning has been reached.
The relevance of the body of research on awareness 
extends to the dynamics of human behavior. Eriksen (I96O) 
pointed out that:
Common sense tells us that we are constantly 
utilizing cues of which we are unaware in our 
perception of depth, of shape and size constancy, 
as well as a number of cues that guide such 
complex motor habits as piano playing and 
driving automobiles (p. 293)*
To the degree that laboratory learning situations are
analogous to human experiences in general, findings can be
applied to improving the understanding and treatment of
deviant behavior.
Among clinical psychologists it is widely 
believed that in ordinary social interaction 
people often respond, in ways of which they 
are unaware, to stimuli which they are unaware 
they are responding to, and that such behavior 
without awareness can be of special importance 
in psychopathology. In therapy great stress 
is placed on the importance of becoming aware 
of the stimuli to which one responds, of the 
response one makes, and of the reasons that 
one responds in the way one does (Adams, 1957, 
p. 384).
Further, the research questions how non-directive therapy 
is. In discussing Carl Rogers' report of the treatment of 
Herbert Bryan, Frank (1959) said;
The therapist presumably believed that he 
was not influencing the patient's productions, 
yet different raters were able to classify 
his interventions as implicitly approving or 
disapproving with a high degree of reliability. 
Apparently a therapist can strongly affect his 
patient's productions without being aware that 
he is doing so (p. 28).
Awareness Defined by Learning Curve
At this point the bulk of research has been addressed 
to the question of determining if learning can occur without 
the learner's awareness of what, how, or why he is learning.
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The focus of attention has been on the word "awareness". 
Awareness is a hypothetical construct which must be deter­
mined from other measurements. Thorndike and Rock (193^) 
defined awareness as a sudden rise in performance of a 
learning task. Conversely, gradual acquisition was concluded 
to indicate learning without awareness. They demonstrated 
their hypotheses with a verbal task and a motor task. Sub­
jects were asked to free associate to a list of words. When 
their responses were prompted by sequential usage, the 
experimenter said "good". When their responses were defini­
tional in nature, the experimenter said "wrong". In the 
motor task the subject was required to place his forefinger 
on one side of a board and to place a pencil point at the 
same spot on the other side of the board. If the subject 
was off the point within a given radius in a given quadrant, 
the experimenter said "good”. In both situations subjects 
acquired the desired behavior gradually.
However, Irwin, Kauffman, Prior, and Weaver (1934) 
undertook a further test of the conclusions of Thorndike and 
Rock. They used the verbal association task, but instructed 
some of their subjects as to the purpose and principle 
involved in making correct responses. The informed subjects 
did not have a sharp rise in correct responses, continuing 
to improve gradually. These experimenters maintained that 
awareness does not inevitably produce a sudden increment in 
appropriate performance and hence, slow acquisition can not 
be considered proof of learning without awareness.
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Postman and Jarrett (1952) replicated the preceding 
experiment with one modification. They divided the stimulus 
word list into 12 blocks and questioned each subject at the 
end of each block to determine at what point, if any, the 
subject was aware of the correct solution. At the outset 
they did not provide the subjects with any verification of 
the adequacy of their solutions. Those subjects who were 
informed during the experiment showed an abrupt change in 
performance immediately following receipt of the pertinent 
information. The subjects who were not informed showed small 
amounts of improvement through the block of trials after 
which they correctly stated the principle and then promptly 
produced a substantial gain in correct responses. The data 
seems to support the Thorndike-Rock view that learning 
occurs without awareness although less efficiently than 
learning with awareness.
Awareness Defined by Self Report
The shape of the learning curve does not appear to 
afford a definitive identification of aweureness. The method 
of questioning subjects has been much more widely used. "The 
most frequent definition of aweureness and unawareness is in. 
terms of verbal report. Awareness is equated with the abil­
ity to verbalize and unawareness with the inability or lack 
of verbalization"(Eriksen, I960, p. 280). Researchers have 
found it convenient to use the oral or written reports of
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subjects as criteria of subjects* awareness. "For practical 
experimental purposes it has been necessary to equate aware­
ness with the capability to verbalize certain events" 
(Kimble, I962, pp. 43-44). What might be a simple direct 
approach to the problem has created the issue of the proper 
means to the end of eliciting the reports that serve to 
categorize subjects as aware or unaware and demonstrate 
that learning can or cannot occur without awareness.
First, there is the trivial point that it 
seems unlikely that learning occurs at all in 
generally unaware subjects, such as those who 
are deeply asleep. If this is what is meant by 
learning without awareness, there is no secure 
evidence that such learning ever occurs. Experi­
menters in this area, however, define awareness 
somewhat differently, in terms of the recogni­
tion of certain experimentally arranged contin­
gencies (Kimble, 1962, p. 44).
There is no standard technique. Experimenters have used 
interviews and questionnaires of varying content and length 
administered periodically during the testing, after perfor­
mance indicates learning has occurred, at the end of the 
test, after an extinction period, and after some lapse of 
time. From their available data, they have arrived at a 
dichotomous classification from which they infer that 
subjects were or were not learning with awareness.
A departure from the either-or categorization of 
subjects was made by Davis and Hess (I962). They determined 
levels of awareness for their subjects and found that 
learning was related to the level of awareness. In some 
experiments the concern has been only with the subject
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becoming aweure of rhe correct response which Dulany (I962) 
has labeled Behavioral Hypothesis. Other experiments have 
measured awareness of Dulany's Reinforcement Hypothesis which 
involves two steps, the first being awareness of the occur­
rence of some reinforcement, and the second being awareness 
of the relationship of the reinforcement to the correct 
response class.
Behaviors which have been conditioned in the experi­
mental laboratories have been verbal, motor, and autonomic. 
They have included attitude formation and change and 
problem-solving. Reinforcements used have been verbal, 
perceptual, auditory, and tactual, both positive and 
negative.
Research on Changing Verbal Behavior
One commonly used technique requires the subjects to 
construct sentences using one of a list of pronouns with a 
given verb. The use of the first or third person pronouns 
is reinforced. In such cases where the singular and plural 
forms are both correct, a solution using only the singular 
or the plural would be partially correct, but would lead to 
100 percent reinforcement. Cohen, Kalish, Thurston, and 
Cohen (1954) presented this task to medical patients in a 
veterans hospital. They reinforced correct responses by the 
experimenter saying "good". Subjects were given 80 trials 
at the end of which they were questioned to determine if
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they were aware. There was no reported awareness. The 
reinforced group of subjects had a significant rise in their 
usage of first person pronouns. The control group did not. 
An additional 80 trials were then given without reinforce­
ment and a lowered rate of usage indicated that extinction 
was taking place. The same task and reinforcement were 
used by Beirnett, Pryer, and Ellis (1959) with institution­
alized mental defectives. Their subjects were not aweire; 
the experimental group conditioned and the controls did not.
Twelve groups of subjects from a hospital population 
were used by Leventhal (1959)« They were divided by diag­
nosis as medical patients, neurotics, and schizophrenics. 
Within each category four groups were reinforced differently. 
One group were told "good' when they gave the correct 
responses. Another were told "not so good" when they 
responded incorrectly, while a third group received both the 
positive and the negative reinforcements. A control group 
were told nothing. At the end of the 60-item test subjects 
were asked five questions to determine if they were aware, 
and those who were judged as aweire were eliminated from the 
analysis. All of the reinforced groups among the medical 
cases, who were considered normal mentally, differed signi­
ficantly from the control group. The negatively reinforced 
neurotic group and the positively reinforced schizophrenic 
group did not perform differently than the controls.
To control the possibility of a verbal reinforcement 
varying in inflection and, hence, in meaning to the subjects.
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Wolpiîi and Milgram (I962) recorded the word "good". They 
selected for use two vocalizations of the word, one rated 
by judges to convey positive connotations and one rated as 
equivocal. A l6-item interview determined awareness. 
Approximately half the subjects who increased their use of 
first person pronouns fell in the unaware category. There 
was no difference in the two reinforcement groups.
De Wolfe (1962) followed Adams' (1957) suggestion 
that solutions that are partially correct should be consid­
ered in evaluating awareness. He reinforced the use of 
first person pronouns with "good". Following extinction 
trials, he asked his subjects how they selected pronouns and 
if anything he said influenced their choices. On the basis 
of their answers, he classified subjects as aware, partially 
aware, and unaware. The three classes of subjects were not 
statistically different in their performances.
Farher (I963) found no relation of performance on 
the sentence construction task to intelligence, manifest 
anxiety, or introversion. He did find that conformity and 
set were determining variables. He verbally reinforced the 
pronoun "you". After 20 trials, half the subjects were 
instructed that they were doing poorly. In all, 80 trials 
were given before a questionnaire was administered to deter­
mine awareness and conformity. Subjects who were given 
failure instructions performed at a lower level than those 
who were not. However, when he considered aware and unaware
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subjects separately, instructions did not account for signi­
ficant differences in learning; that is, the instructions 
influenced the awareness rather than the learning directly.
-I
The conforming subjects were superior to the non-conformers. 
Since some of his aware subjects did not learn and some of 
his unaware subjects did learn, he concluded that learning 
can occur without awareness although less efficiently. He 
suggested that some learning precedes awareness.
Half the subjects who participated in an experiment 
conducted by Dixon and Oakes (1965) were given a color- 
naming task between trials on the sentence-completion task. 
All subjects received the same reinforcement of "good"'.
There was no statistically significant difference in the 
performances of the subjects who had the interfering inter­
trial activity and those who did not. The color-namers were 
not able to verbalize the relevant solution.
Spielberger, Levin, and Shepard (I962) criticized 
the interviews and questionnaires that indicated that 
learning occurred without awaireness on the grounds that they 
were not extensive enough. After subjects completed the 
sentence-construction task, reinforced with "good", they 
were asked four general questions similar to those other 
researchers have used, and then answered a number of more 
specific questions. The subjects who did not state correct 
solutions at any time did not show that they had learned.
The aware subjects were classified according to whether they
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stated correct solutions during the brief or extended inter­
view. The mean for the brief interview subjects was much 
higher but because of their wide variability, there was no 
statistical difference in the two groups.
College students and neuropsychiatrie patients were 
reinforced in three ways by Buss, Gerjuoy, Irma, and Zusman 
(1958). One group was given the conventional treatment of 
"good" for the correct pronoun. A second group was given 
chips that could be exchanged for cigarettes or candy. The 
third group was given non-exchangeable chips. At the end 
of the experiment, the subjects were asked what relation 
the experimenter's behavior had to their own behavior. The 
only group in which learning occurred that did not verbalize 
the correct contingency were the patients who were verbally 
reinforced.
A brief and extended interview was used by Levin 
(1961) with neuropsychiatrie and medical patients after 100 
trials. The I6 subjects who verbalized the correct solution 
during the extended interview showed better learning than 
the 35 subjects who verbalized awareness during the brief 
interview. The 4l unaware subjects did not differ from the 
control subjects who had received no reinforcement. However, 
subjects who indicated that they were not aware in any way 
of the reinforcement "good" learned as well as those who 
were aware of the reinforcement.
Binder and Salop (I961) used a slightly different 
sentence-construction task. They reinforced the use of
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past-tense verbs. One subject group was told ’’good-*, another 
was shocked electrically, and another was a control group 
not receiving any reinforcement. All subjects who were 
judged to be aware of the purpose of the experiment were 
eliminated from the analysis. The first group showed the 
best acquisition and the slowest extinction. The second
group showed the fastest extinction.
The differential effects produced by different experi­
menters were studied by Binder, McConnell, and Sjoholm (1957)- 
They verbally reinforced the choice of hostile verbs from a 
list of verbs in a sentence-construction task. Their inter­
view determined that unaware subjects learned. They found a 
significant difference between the subjects conditioned by 
the two experiment ers.
Kanfer and McBrearty (I961) üTs'ed a similar task to 
explore the role of the discriminability of the stimuli.
Only two verbs were presented on each trial. For one group
of subjects a neutral verb was paired with a mildly hostile
verb. For the other group a neutral verb was paired with 
an intensely hostile verb. Each time a subject chose a 
hostile verb the experiment er said "good”. A six-item 
questionnaire was the basis for determining awareness.
Stimuli with high discriminability produced more awareness, 
but poorer learning for the unaware subjects. The aware 
subjects learned better, but the unaware subjects did learn.
The preceding experiment was replicated with addi­
tional variables by Kanfer and Marston (I96I). Besides
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discriminability, they investigated the ambiguity of the 
reinforcement by telling one group of subjects "good” and 
flashing a green light, which they considered more ambiguous, 
for the other group. They also varied the instructions 
they gave; half the subjects were told that they would score 
points each time they were reinforced. A transfer situation 
was introduced after 100 trials. Then an interview deter­
mined if the subjects were aware. Results showed the aware 
subjects were able to perform the transfer task better.
More subjects who were reinforced by "good" were aware, but 
did not learn significantly better. The subjects who 
received more information in the instructions learned better. 
An analysis of the data considering sex of the subjects 
revealed no differences between males and females.
Dulany (1962) conditioned the use of "I", "we", 
active words, and hostile verbs with electric shock, a 
mechanical tone, and a verbal "um-hmm". He found that the 
particular task or reinforcement was not a significant 
source of variation in performance. Neither was the eimount 
of information given to the subject, when only subjects who 
were aware were considered. He also found that arousing 
hostility in the subjects produced poorer performance.
Subjects had to use two cues to determine which words 
in a 16-word list were correct to elicit "good" from the 
experimenter in a study conducted by Krieckhaus and Eriksen 
(i960). Subjects were told "no" when they chose incorrectly.
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The cues were semantic and color. For half the subjects 
the correct words were related to the sea and were in a 
specific color. For the other half the correct words were 
related to farming and were in a specific color. An 
extensive interview was used to obtain an evaluation of 
awareness. Incorrect solutions were checked to determine 
if they would lead to better than chance performance if they 
were followed. In no case was it found that they would. 
Learning for the aware subjects was much better, but unaware 
subjects did learn more than the controls who received no 
reinforcement. The experimenters suggested that some of 
the unaware subjects might have been misclassified. It 
was also possible that some of the aware subjects stated a 
correct solution by chance and so were misclassified since 
32 percent of the control subjects were able to state the 
correct solution.
In a word association task, Weiss (1955) reinforced 
any reference to living things. There were 240 words 
divided into 12 blocks. At the end of each block the 
experimenter questioned the subjects to determine awareness. 
Half the subjects were told they were being timed but the 
set for speed was not a significant factor. One group of 
subjects were informed of the principle after which they 
showed a sharp rise in acquisition. The only significant 
changes in the learning curves of the uninformed subjects 
occurred at the point of verbalizing the principle.
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There was no indication of leeurning without awareness 
in two experiments conducted by Wilson and Verplanck (1956) 
because almost all their subjects were aware. In the first 
study the subjects were told to speak words without repeating 
and without forming sentences. Each subject gave 800 words, 
the first 100 to determine their operant rates. For the 
next 300 half the subjects were reinforced for plural nouns, 
the other half for adverbs. No reinforcement was given for 
the next 100 words, and the final 300 were reinforced 
according t^ the principle not previously used for the sub­
ject. In the second experiment travel words or references 
to living things were reinforced and the transfer task was 
eliminated. Reinforcements were "mmm-hmmm", "good” , and 
the experiment er writing down the word. Some subjects 
interpreted the writing down as a negative sign and conse-^ 
quently displayed a sort of negative learning.
Greenspoon (1955) used the same sort of verbal task.
He said ”mmm-hmmm" every time the subject gave a plural 
word and ”huh-uh” for all other words. He used four quest­
ions in the interview portion of the experiment to elimi­
nate subjects who were aware of the purpose of the experi­
ment. The unaware subjects increased their use of plural 
words while they were being reinforced and decreased their 
use of plural words when the reinforcement was omitted.
Sidowski (1954) had previously used the Greenspoon 
technique, but used a visual reinforcement, a light. There
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were four groups of subjects. Group I were instructed to 
try to turn on the light by reciting the right words and 
were presented the light every time they spoke a plural 
word. Group II were not told to try to turn on the light, 
but the light was turned on when they gave plural words.
For Giroup III the light was turned on randomly, and Giroup 
IV received no reinforcement. After each subject gave 325 
words, he was asked two questions to reveal if he was 
aware. On that basis three subjects from each of the first 
two groups were eliminated. Although the mean for Group II 
was higher than the mean for Group I, it was not statis­
tically significantly so. Both Groups I and II were signi­
ficantly above Groups III and IV. While Matarazzo, Saslow, 
and Pareis (1959) were able to condition human responses, 
they were not able to condition plural responses.
To avoid any influence in the subjects' reports of 
awareness caused by reactions to the experimenter, Wein­
stein and Lawson (1963) used a confederate to interview 
subjects. The confederate posed as another subject who was 
waiting to take peirt in the experiment. During the time 
the confederate and the subject were left alone, the confed­
erate asked a number of questions about what the experiment 
was all about. The experimenters administered two further 
tests of the subjects' awareness, which called for a great 
deal of inference. Subjects were asked to check appropriate 
words in a list and to write down other appropriate words.
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However, the two tests offer no more evidence of awcireness 
than the Greenspoon task itself. Pour groups of subjects 
recited words for forty minutes. There were a control group 
that were not reinforced, one group that were reinforced 
with a verbal -'good" and a nod of the head, another rein­
forced group that were told after 20 minutes that correct 
responses were being reinforced, and a reinforced group 
that were told after 20 minutes how to respond. The pro­
cedure was an attempt to control awareness. The experimen­
ters reported that the fully informed subjects in the 
fourth group did not all verbalize the correct contingency. 
The uninformed but reinforced subjects did not differ from 
the control subjects.
Speilberger and DeNike (I962) used an extended inter­
view after administering the Greenspoon task and found no 
subjects who were aware. Neither did they find any evidence 
of learning by a count of plural words spoken during a set 
time period or by the percentage of all words spoken that 
were plural in form. Their control and reinforced subjects 
were matched for operant rate of emitting plural words.
College students who had been academically exposed 
to the verbal conditioning phenomenon were subjects for 
Krasner, Weiss, and Ullman (1959). Only 38 percent of 
these relatively sophisticated subjects reported awareness. 
Their levels of performance were not related to awareness.
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Research Using Problem-Solving Tasks
A problem of number relationships was used by Phil- 
brick and Postman (1955)- Subjects were told that the 
experimenter would recite a list of words after each of 
which they were to give a number between one and nine, and 
each time they gave the correct number they would be told 
"right". The correct solution was the number that was one 
less than the amount of letters in the word. The list 
contained 216 words divided into 24 blocks. After every 
block in which four responses were correct, the subject was 
asked to verbalize his solution. The 20 subjects who 
verbalized correctly showed significant improvement before 
verbalization and a sharp rise in performance at the point 
of verbalization. For the 28 subjects who were not aware, 
the improvement was slower but still significant.
The same task was used by Hirsch (1957), who studied 
the role of the reinforcement. He told some subjects when 
they were right, other subjects when they were wrong, and 
other subjects when they were both right and wrong. He 
gave half his subjects partial reinforcement and the other 
half continuous reinforcement. There were 324 words in 24 
blocks plus 12 for extinction trials. He followed the same 
procedure of inquiry as Philbrick and Postman. The type ~ 
and schedule of reinforcement were not related to acquisi­
tion, but were related to extinction. Improvement occurred
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before the correct solution was given. No subject gave an 
incorrect solution that could have improved performance.
Sassenrath (1962) employed the Philbrick-Postman 
method with an additional transfer task for which the correct 
solution was subtracting the number of letters in the word 
from 11. Subjects with partially correct solutions were not 
included in the unaware group which learned better than the 
control group on both tasks. The best performers on the 
transfer task had been informed of the principle for the 
transfer at the start of their trials.
Davis and Hess (I962) did not reinforce solutions to 
their anagram task, since the subject knew when he had 
solved a problem. The— experimenters were interested in 
determining if subjects developed a pattern for the solu­
tions without awareness. During the training trials, each 
anagram could be solved by making the same shift of letters 
according to position. For each of the test trials there 
were two possible solutions, one of which followed the 
principle that was involved during the training trials and 
was considered correct. Learning was measured by the number 
of correct solutions and by response latency. Three open- 
ended questions in written form were the basis for classi­
fying subjects by levels of awareness. Both measures of 
learning were directly related to the levels of awareness.
Teska (19^2) used a series of ten problems that 
required a motor response in a multiple-choice situation.
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Subjects were shown a square screen divided into quadrants 
next to each of which was a button and told to try to light 
the red light above it by pushing the correct button. On 
each trial two quadrants were blank, one contained a tri­
angle, and one a square. For some of the problems two 
colors were added as cues in addition to the shapes and 
spatial relations. Since the researcher was primarily 
interested in the problem-solving process, he attempted to 
get subjects who had indicated they had learned the solution 
by illuminating the light on several successive trials to 
verbalize their solutions. He found that some subjects who 
had learned could not verbalize correctly. Some of the 
subjects did state incorrect solutions and then continued 
to respond correctly. Hensley (1957)> who used the same 
task, found no evidence of leeirning without awareness.
Tatz (i960) instructed his subjects to recite numbers 
in groups of three. Each time the subject gave one of two 
correct numb er s, he was reinforced. Half the subjects were 
told "good-', and the others heard a click. Half the sub­
jects were informed of the reinforcement. An extended 
interview was used to identify four levels of awareness: 
fully aware, an incorrect solution that led to 100 percent 
reinforcement, an incorrect solution that led to less than 
100 percent but better than chance reinforcement, and 
unaware. The unaware subjects did not learn. Some subjects 
reported that they thought the click was annoying and tried 
to avoid it.
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A study of the relation of retention and generaliza­
tion to awareness was conducted by Manis and Barnes (196I). 
They asked their subjects to identify insignia as friendly 
or unfriendly. Each insignia consisted of four numbers, 
and the correct solution depended upon the position of the 
numerals 2 and 5- Subjects were informed that they would 
be told if they were right or wrong. After the reinforced 
trials, circles were substituted for numbers (e.g., three 
circles for the number 3 ), and subjects were told to 
respond with the same schemes they had been using. Then 
they were given the original task without reinforcement 
to measure retention. One direct question was used to 
determine awareness. The unaware subjects learned, 
generalized, and retained, but not as well as the aware 
subj ects.
Research on Changing Content of Conversation
When subjects were asked to discuss the relative 
advantages of study in the fields of science, English, and 
art, Sullivan and Calvin (1959) were unable to condition an 
increase in time spent talking about any of the fields over 
several sessions. For each subject, the experimenter said 
"mmm-hmmm" each time he mentioned a specific field.
Krasner, Weiss, and Ullman (1961) tried to explain 
away that they conditioned subjects to use emotional words 
in TAT stories without the subjects being aware. Their
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subjects were college students who had just finished readings 
on verbal conditioning and had each verbally conditioned a 
classmate. Subjects who had revealed no awareness during 
the question period later claimed that they had misunderstood 
the questions. Even though they all said later that they 
had noticed the reinforcement, they could not all state the 
correct response class.
Quay (1959) mailed questionnaires to his subjects 
after sessions in which he conditioned them to relate more 
of specific types of childhood memories. Only one of the 
34 subjects was fully aware, although 15 more had noticed 
that he had said "un-huh" during their sessions.
On two types of tasks, Eisman (1959) demonstrated 
learning without awareness which he measured with a three- 
question interview. The first task was the identification 
of ink blots as human or anatomical, which were correct 
responses, or animal or botanical. The second task was to 
use the first person pronouns in constructing sentences. 
Subjects who received no reinforcement did not show acqui­
sition. Those who were reinforced did learn. Further 
evidence of learning was in the extinction of the conditioned 
behaviors that occurred for the subjects on a full rein­
forcement schedule. Those on a partial schedule did not 
extinguish.
Nuthmann (1957) conditioned increased self-acceptance 
by saying "good" whenever her subjects indicated that
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positive self-referrent statements were true and negative 
statements were false. However, flashing a light was not 
effective as a reinforcer for this behavior. She asked 
subjects to state the relationship of the reinforcement 
to their behavior. Those who were unable to conditioned as 
well as those who were.
Research on Changing Physiological Responses
Chatterjee and Eriksen (I962) conditioned a change 
in heart rate by presenting a word list and pairing an 
electric shock with certain words. They determined aware­
ness with an interrogation and by having subjects indicate 
the frequency with which shock was paired with each word 
in a printed list. The more information they gave subjects 
at the outset, the more aware they were and the better they 
conditioned and extinguished. The subjects who had received 
no information were classified for awareness as revealed by 
the check list. The unaware subjects did not condition 
differently from the aware subjects.
Lacey and Smith (195^) also conditioned a change in 
heart rate by the same technique. They questioned their 
subjects before extinction and eliminated all those who 
were judged as aware. The unaware subjects almost all 
reported trying to formulate a plan, but their hypotheses 
were not even partially correct.
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Summary
A variety of human behaviors have been conditioned 
with a variety of reinforcements. Whether or not such 
learning can be said to take place without awareness depends 
upon the experimenter's bias which is reflected in his 
definition of awareness and his procedures for demonstrating 
its presence or absence. There seems to be a direct rela­
tionship in the number of trials and the number of aware 
subjects and their levels of awareness. The number of 
questions has an even more marked correlation with aware­
ness. "It is conceivable that all ^ 's in the verbal 
conditioning paradigm would verbalize the contingency if 
enough questions are asked in the interview. Each question 
may provide ^  with some information about the contingency" 
(Greenspoon, 1963, p. 29). Levin (1961) elaborated on 
this idea.
The content of the questions might have 
stimulated _S to look back over the task, 
reorganize his impressions and thereby 
formulate a correct contingency. In other 
words, ^  might have been led to verbalize a 
correct contingency merely as a result of 
being questioned about the task. This form 
of suggestion would be difficult to eliminate 
since it could always be argued that S_'s 
response to any question is suggested to him 
by the content of the question and does not 
reflect something of which he was aware 
before the question was asked (p. ).
Experimenters who interviewed their subjects as 
opposed to having them fill out a questionnaire generally
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rated more subjects as aware and at higher levels of aware­
ness. If tjie experimental situation during conditioning is 
analogous to a psychotherapy setting, the analogy can be 
extended to the interview as well, if not even more validly. 
The clinician is often interested in guiding the client to 
the recovery, or discovery, of experiences of which he is 
not conscious at present and possibly never was. He may 
even be unaware of the ways in which he is directing the 
client and of the specific responses he is striving for. 
Krasner and Ullmann (1963) concluded that the reported 
level of awareness is influenced by informational cues and 
is another form of behavior that can be conditioned. "It 
would seem reasonable to hypothesize that examiner behavior 
cues are more effective while the _S is not aware that he 
is responding to them" (Krasner, 1958, p. 165)*
If somehow all experimenter bias could be factored 
out of the data, there probably would be undeniable evidence 
for learning without awareness. Humans do seem to emit 
behaviors which they have learned without being able to 
state the conditions that prevailed during the learning or 
the present stimulus that elicited the behavior. "It is 
an outmoded and unnecessary assumption that the modification 
of behavior must be preceded by a correct understanding of 
the environmental contingencies” (Postman and Sassenrath, 
1961, p. 134). Most of the evidence demonstrates that such 
learning takes place more slowly, less efficiently, and less
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perfectly than when the learner is aware of all cues and 
contingencies.
Until recently the majority of research on human 
conditioning has been concerned with the demonstration of 
learning with or without awareness.
Previous investigators have distinguished 
between verbalizers and nonverbalizers by such 
terms as aware-not aware, insightful-noninsight- 
ful, and conscious-unconscious, with inferential 
accompaniments comparable to the level of the 
constructs used. A number of papers (especially 
recently) have challenged the procedure of 
determining awareness or insight on the basis 
of the responses to a restricted set of 
questions. . . . The defining process is a
function of' the theoretical position for which 
the given research is supplying further infor­
mation. . . . It is quite possible that one
could establish very interesting and important 
empirical laws purely on the basis of defining 
awareness and unawareness in verbal conditioning 
on the basis of the responses of "Yes" and "No", 
respectively, to the question, "Do you know 
why I said 'good' during the experiment?"
There is no doubt that the quantity of s in 
the category unaware would diminish as the 
list of questions increased in length and 
specificity. The argument that the s 
eliminated from the unaware group as defined 
by a given set of questions on the basis of 
one more specific question or a wink or a bit 
of gossip were not really unaware in the first 
place carries a number of theoretical and 
philosophical risks (Binder and Salop, I96I, 
pp. 392-396).
Most of the research has measured awareness with 
the criterion of verbalization. Thus verbalization has 
been regarded as an experimental tool rather than a phenome­
non worthy of investigation. But more understanding of the 
processes of learning, problem-solving, and personality 
development can be gained through the study of what people
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report about what, how, and why they behave as they do in 
learning and problem-solving situations. There is no need 
to go beyond the empirical data to infer intervening 
variables. Then the relationship of verbalization to 
various types of learning and problem-solving can be 
studied, as well as the conditions that will or will not 
lead to verbalization of what has been learned or solved 
and the recognition of reinforcements.
CHAPTER II 
PROBLEM
This study was designed to investigate the verbali­
zation of problem-solving behavior when comect responses 
were and were not reinforced by the experimenter and when 
the problem was and was not stated by the experiment er.
Eriksen (I962) had suggested that learning without verbali­
zation would be most likely to occur in simple learning 
situations with perceptual cues as behavioral guides. Such 
conditions would be as free as possible from the influence 
of previous experiences which might have emotional loading 
for subjects. Hence, it would be more appropriate to 
conjecture that if learning without verbalization did occur 
under such conditions, the phenomenon could be expected to 
occur in more complex, emotion-producing conditions.
A problem-solving task that called for motor behavior 
was used to minimize any effects of previous experiences and 
pre-formed habits of behavior. The experimenter's behavior 
and personality and interaction with subjects was removed 
as much as possible by using a mechanic ally presented per­
ceptual reinforcement and a printed questionnaire.
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Handler and Kaplan (1956) found that "the results of 
this study indicate that in human verbal learning, the 
subjects' subjective evaluation of the reinforcing stimulus 
may provide an independent measure of the reinforcing value 
of a verbal reinforcer" (pp. 582-583)- So the questionnaire 
determined if the reinforcer was noticed, and if it was, 
whether it was annoying or distracting and was avoided.
The following hypotheses were tested:
1. There will be no learning without verbalization 
of the reinforcement contingency.
2. Learning will occur more efficiently when a 
problem has been stated and the reinforcement has been 
specified by the experimenter.
3 . Subjects will tend to create a problem and find
a solution for it when no problem has been posed externally.
4. The presence of some stimulus which might be 
perceived as associated with specific responses will 
emphasize this tendency to create a problem.
5 . There will be no difference in the performance
of those who verbalize the reinforcement contingency without 
leading questions and those who need more prompting-.- —
6 . If there are differences in performances, they 





Subjects for the experiment were 66 volunteer under­
graduate students at the University of Oklahoma. They were 
assigned to four groups.
There were 17 subjects in Group I, which was a control 
group that received no reinforcement. There were 17 subjects 
in Group II, which was also a control group, but received 
the visual reinforcement of a flash of red light for every 
response made. There were l6 subjects in both Groups III 
and IV which were experimental groups receiving the rein­
forcing red light each time the correct response was made. 
Groups I, II, and III were not informed that they were to 
solve a problem or that the red light would flash. Group IV 
was told that they were to solve a problem and that a red 
light would flash each time the correct response was made.
The subject with the first appointment was placed in Group I, 
the second subject was placed in Group II, the third sub­
ject in Group III, and the fourth in Group IV. All the 
following subjects were assigned to groups in the same
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order. This method of assignment was used to eliminate any 
bias that might have been caused by the time of day of 
testing.
Equipment
The problem-solving box designed and used by Teska 
(19^2 ) was used. The box is constructed of wood with a 
slanted surface facing the subject. This side of the box 
has an opening approximately five inches square which is 
covered with translucent material that is divided into four 
equal quadrants. Above this opening is a pin point opening 
also covered with translucent material. At the side of 
each of the quadrants is a push button. Inside the box 
are a white light bulb that illuminates the larger opening 
and a red light that illuminates the smaller opening.
Opaque discs fit between the white light and the 
screen. In each disc triangles and squares are cut out for 
the light to shine through and appear on the screen. The 
arrangement of figures is such that a triangle appears in 
one quadrant and a square in another and two quadrants are 
blank. Each disc contains 20 combinations. When the button 
next to the quadrant that has been designated as correct is 
pushed, the red light behind the smaller opening is turned 
on for one second. Three seconds after a button has been 




Subjects in Groups I, II, and III received the 
following instructions :
You are talcing part in a study of the 
relation of perception to choice behavior.
In the center of the box in front of you is 
a square screen divided into four equal 
parts. Next to each one of the four parts 
is a button. Figures appear in some of the 
four small squares on the screen and some of 
the squares are blank. You are to choose one 
of the buttons to push for each combination.
Each combination will remain on the screen 
until you push one of the buttons and for 
a few seconds afterwards. Then a new combi­
nation will appear on the screen, and you are 
to push one button each time a new combination 
appears. Do not push more than one button 
for any one combination. Do you have any 
questions? (Questions were answered by 
repeating the relevant portion of the 
instructions.)
Subjects in Group IV received the following instruc­
tions :
You are taking part in a study of problem­
solving behavior. In the center of the box 
in front of you is a squeire screen divided into 
four equal parts. Next to each one of the four 
parts is a button. Figures appear in some of 
the four small squares on the screen and some 
of the squares are blank. You are to choose 
one of the buttons to push for each combina­
tion. Each combination will remain on the 
screen until you push one of the buttons and 
for a few seconds afterwards. Then a new 
combination will appear on the screen, and you 
are to push one button each time a new combi­
nation appeeirs. Do not push more than one 
button for any one combination. Each time you 
push the correct button, a red light will flash.
Do you have any questions? (Questions were 
answered by repeating the relevant portion of 
the instructions.)
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Then 60 trials were given. The red light was con­
cealed for Group I. The red light flashed each time a 
button was pushed for Group II. For Groups III and IV, the 
red light flashed each time the button next to the triangle 
was pushed. The experiment er sat to the right and to the 
reeir of the subjects, recording on a tally sheet each 
response each subject made. When the trials were completed, 
each subject was handed a questionnaire in booklet form 
with one question at the top of each page and the following 
instructions on the cover page:
You are to follow the instructions at the top
of each page in order. Do not turn a page
until you have completed it. You are not to
go back to a previous page. Do not turn back.
1. State why you chose the buttons you did.
Be as explicit and complete in your 
answer as possible.
2. Did you notice anything happening while 
you were doing this test?
3. If your answer to 2 was yes, state if 
what you noticed had any, and if any, 
what effect on your choice of buttons.
4. Did you notice a red light turning on 
during the experiment?
5. If your answer to 4 was no, stop here.
If it was yes, state if the red light 
had any, and if any, what effect on your 
choice of buttons.
6 . Did you find the red light annoying or 
distracting?
7. How hard did you try to turn on the light?
Check one.
Avoided______ Not at all______ Some______
Most of the time All the time
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS
To test Hypothesis 1, learning was measured by 
counting the number of times the button by the triangle 
was pushed. The mean for Group 1 was 23> the mean for 
Group 11 was 22, the mean for Group 111 was 22, and the 
mean for Group IV was 50. The mean for all groups was 30 
(see Table l). Subject 7 in Group 111 was counted by the 
number of times he did not push the triangle button since 
this subject stated that the red light was avoided.
TABLE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF TIMES BUTTON BY TRIANGLE 
PUSHED FOR 60 TRIALS
Groups
1 11 111 IV Total
N 17 17 l6 16 66
Mean 23 22 22 50 30
The mean of the total sample was selected as the 
breaking point for the analysis of the data. In Group
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III there were six subjects who fell above this point. Of 
these, three verbalized the reinforcement contingency. Ten 
subjects fell below the breaking point, and three of them 
verbalized the contingency. The probability of this occur­
ring is .33 and is not significant (see Table 2).
TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF SUBJECTS IN GROUP 111 











More Than 30 Times
Pushed Correctly 
Less Than 30 Times
.33®
@Not significant at .05 level
Group 111 was compared to the control subjects,
Groups 1 and 11, using the same criterion of 30 correct 
responses. In each control group 5 subjects pushed the 
button by the triangle more than 30 times, while 12 subjects 
pushed it less than 30 times. In Group 111 6 subjects were 
above and 10 below the breaking point. The obtained 
of .31 was not significant with two degrees of freedom (see 
Table 3). Hypothesis 1 must be rejected, but with the
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reservation that the performance of the experimental subjects 
did not differ significantly from the control subjects.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF GROUP III 














Times 5 5 6 2 .31®Pushed Correctly
Less Than 30
Times 12 12 10
@Not Significant at .05 level
Group III was compared with Group IV to test Hypo­
thesis 2. Fifteen subjects from Group IV responded 
correctly more than 30 times, while only one subject from 
that group failed to reach this criterion of performance. 
Ten subjects from Group III made the correct response less 
than 30 times and six subjects made the correct response 
more than 30 times. Using Yates' correction for small 
samples, a of 6.78 was obtained. With one degree of
freedom, this value is significant at the .01 level (see 
Table 4). Hypothesis 2 is tenable.
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TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE OF GROUPS III AND IV
Group III 
N = 16







More Than 30 Times 6 15 1 6 .78»
Pushed Correctly
Less Than 30 Times 10 1
*Signifieant at .01 level
Since Group III did not differ significantly from 
the control groups, Group IV can be said to differ from 
the control groups to the same degree it differed from 
Group III. Thus the response behavior of Group IV demon­
strated that learning occurred.
Eleven of the 17 subjects of Group I described 
response patterns that were not random. In Group II 13 of 
the 17 subjects verbalized non-random behavior as did 9 of 
the l6 subjects in Group III. In answer to the first 
question of the questionnaire, these subjects indicated 
that they had formulated problems for which they arrived at 
solutions. Examples of the solutions are : "First, I
didn't know exactly which button to push, but then I 
decided I would push the square each time to keep some 
order about it." "I was trying to perceive a certain 
pattern that followed with a certain button. Also, to see
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if the same pattern would appear twice for the same button.’*
Ô— ~”I chose the buttons that were clearer and closer to the
center.” "Because the triangle always seemed the one that
didn't correspond to the others. The blank squares were
'square', plus the other square, so the triangle didn't
belong." Examples of random behavior are: "Sometimes 1
pushed the button which corresponded to figure that
attracted my eye more and sometimes I just pushed a different
button to break the monotony.” "I chose the buttons simply
(after I got started) as to my first reaction to push.
Just strictly by feeling." "Well, why not. It was like
gambling. Who wants to press the same button all the time.
Also the instructions said we could press any button."
"For no peurticular reason."
Thirty-three out of 50 subjects described behavior
that was not random. The statistical probability of this
occurring is 2 times out of 100. Hypothesis 3 can be
accepted since the tendency to pose a problem and find a
solution to it was demonstrated to exist beyond chance
although it is not a universal phenomenon.
2A comparison was made to determine if the red
light which could be interpreted as a reinforcement by the 
subjects would lead to greater numbers of subjects estab­
lishing patterns of response. With two degrees of freedom, 
the of 1-55 (see Table 5) was not significant and
Hypothesis 4 was rejected.
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TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF THE VERBALIZATION OF RESPONSE
PATTERNS BY GROUPS I, II, AND III
Group I 
N = 17
Group II Group III 












2 1 . 5 5 a
@îot significant at -05 level.
All but two subjects in experimental Group III 
reported that they saw the red light. Only six reported 
that they thought the red light was contingent upon the 
responses they made. Three of them reported this in 
answering the first question. They were Subjects 7, 35) 
and 47. Subject 7 reported that at first he tried to light 
the red signal and later tried to avoid it which he did 
successfully on 53 trials. However, he did not state his 
solution. Subject 35 said that he tried to get the red 
light most of the time and succeeded 38 times. His solu­
tion was ’’every time I chose a pattern I had chosen before." 
Subject 47 reported the correct solution and pushed the 
correct button 33 times. He tried to turn on the red light 
all the time.
Subject 27 also verbalized the correct solution, but 
did not state the solution or the contingency until answering
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the second question. He said he tried only some of the time 
to light the signal and did so only 13 times. Subject 51 
verbalized the contingency in response to the second.question. 
He also verbalized an incorrect solution which was the lower 
two buttons. Trying to get the reinforcement most of the 
time, he did so 26 times. Subject 11 stated the contingency 
on question 5, reported no solution, tried to push the 
correct button most of the time, and did so 24 times. None 
of these subjects said that the light was annoying or 
distracting.
The three subjects who verbalized the contingency 
before leading questions were asked did make more correct 
responses than the other three subjects who verbalized the 
contingency only with more direct questioning. However, 
the number of subjects is too small for any valid statis­
tical analysis to be performed. Consequently, Hypotheses 
5 and 6 cannot be tested.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This experiment was designed to eliminate variables 
that might have differential meanings to the subjects- The 
task itself was easy. Hensley (1957) found that only four 
subjects in his dull group having mental ages of 6-2 or 6-1 
and chronological ages of 7-0 to 7-3 failed to solve this 
problem in 60 trials. Some of the subjects in the present 
study reported that they became bored or tired. "The 
triangle always got the correct signal. 1 chose the square 
only to interrupt the monotony of pushing the triangle 
button." "Then 1 became bored and curious and decided to 
experiment." "Sometimes 1 just pushed a different button 
to breeik the monotony." "At first 1 wanted to stick with 
the triangle until 1 got tired of them. Then 1 just pushed 
the button for the square for a change but 1 wouldn't give 
up on the triangle." "Then sometimes 1 got tired of pushing 
the same button so 1 changed."
The stimuli used for the task were simple geometric 
shapes with which it was assumed all the subjects would 
have had similar experiences. However, the shapes seemed 
to have special meaning for some of the subjects. "1
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thought the triangle was more beautiful and interesting." 
"Because a square is clear-cut and well structured." "My 
choice for choosing the buttons I did was due to the 
preference of the completeness of a square as opposed to 
the suggestive incompleteness of a triangle. There are 
four points to a square msdcing an even number while there 
are three points in a triangle giving an odd numb er." "I 
chose the triangle most often because I like the shape of 
it better than a square." "No reason except I always chose 
a square or triangle because I don't like blank spaces."
"1 chose the triangle because it is a more interesting 
shape." Subjects could be screened with a semantic 
differential to eliminate those for whom the stimuli did
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not have neutral, or at least the same, meanings.
Wolpin and Milgram (I962) found no difference in the 
performance and verbalization of subjects receiving recorded 
verbal reinforcements designated as positive for one group 
and equivocal for another group. Using shock, a mechanical 
tone, and "um-hmmm" as reinforcements, Dulany (I962) did 
not demonstrate any significant difference in their effects 
on learning. However, more experimenters found that the 
type of reinforcement affected performance and verbalization. 
Binder, McConnell, and Sjoholm (1957) demonstrated that two 
different experimenters obtained different results. Buss, 
Gerjuoy, Irma, and Zusman (1958) found verbal reinforcement 
produced less verbalization of the contingency than did
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cigarettes and candy and chips, while Binder and Salop
(1961) found that verbal reinforcement produced more 
verbalization than a green light. Some of the subjects 
used by Wilson and Verplanck (1956) interpreted the 
experimenter's writing down responses as a negative sign 
and some of Tatz's (196O) subjects reported that a mechani­
cal click was annoying and they avoided it. Such reports 
indicate that when verbal reinforcement is used, the 
experimenter, his tone of voice, and the subjects' past 
experiences might be sources of variation that would be 
unaccounted for.
A simple visual stimulus, a red light, was selected 
for the reinforcement in this experiment. The questionnaire 
included two questions to determine the emotional content 
of the red light. Seven of the 48 subjects who reported 
seeing the red light said that it was annoying or distracting, 
but only three subjects said that they tried to avoid it.
One of these three was in Group I. In informal questioning 
following completion of the printed questionnaire, this 
subject was unable to tell where the red light was or when 
it was seen. This subject must be suspected of having had 
some information, although erroneous, about the experiment.
The subject from Group 11 who tried to avoid the light did 
not say it was annoying or distracting. Of course, this 
subject could not avoid the red light. The light was not 
annoying or distracting to the subject from Group 111 who
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tried to avoid it. This subject was successful in his 
attempt 53 times, but was unable to verbalize the correct 
solution.
The only subject in droup IV who felt the light was 
cinnoying and distracting tried to turn it on most of the 
time, which he did 50 times; only five in this group per­
formed less well. Of the two subjects in Group III who 
thought the light was annoying or distracting, one did not 
try to light it and did so only 8 times, and the other 
tried some and did 45 times. The latter was considered to 
have learned, but neither verbalized the contingency or 
correct solution. Of the three subjects from Group II who 
reported that the red light was annoying or distracting 
each reported different efforts to turn it on, one not at 
all, one some, and one all the time. One subject in Group II 
and two subjects in Group III did not report seeing the red 
light. However, one of the latter never pushed the button 
by the triangle and so never turned on the red light.
These reports indicate that a red light is not a 
neutral stimulus that all subjects perceive the same way.
Many subjects thought it was a part of the mechanism, while 
others tried to find out how to turn it on. No pattern of 
the relationship of how the subject felt about the rein­
forcement and his performance or verbalization was apparent. 
The safest approach to reinforcing behavior that is to be 
learned seems to be to make certain that the reinforcer is
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desired by the learner. A better method for this experiment 
would have been to determine the color each subject liked 
best and to use that color for the reinforcement.
The physical situation for this experiment was simple. 
There was nothing in the room except chairs, table, the 
problem box which contained both the problem and the rein­
forcement, and the experiment er recording responses. In 
other words, there was a minimum of clues to guide behavior, 
just the forms on the screen and the reinforcement when it 
was appropriate. However, three subjects responded because 
of what they perceived as other relevant cues in the figures 
on the screen. ”I would choose what seemed to me to be the 
leurgest of the two.” "I chose the buttons that were clearer 
and closer to the center.” ”1 picked the buttons because 
of the way the square or triangle were centered in the 
square. The less fuzzier or the better centered in the 
square, the more I liked it.” These could not be considered 
real cues since none of these subjects responded consis­
tently to the patterns each time they appeared on the 
screen.
Another false clue was the experiment er's behavior.
The experiment er marked every response of every subject on 
a tally sheet. Twenty-five subjects reported that they 
noticed the experiment er marking the sheets, and seven of 
them reported that their behavior was thereby influenced.
”I think after I noticed his writing down the answers, I
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chose the block with the square in it more often." "It 
made me think, at first, that there may be some sort of 
pattern and that possibly he was testing to see if I would 
consider finding one." "I caught myself trying to figure 
out his marking system according to the answer." "I was 
more likely to switch between square and triangle whereas 
I might have only chosen triangle." "I would probably kept 
on choosing buttons by 'dominance' as I started out--but 
I knew he was watching— so I thought I would try something 
a little more intelligent (?)." "I think it sometimes 
changed my routine because he was watching." "I didn't 
push as many consecutive buttons as I might have otherwise."
None of the seven who were influenced by the experi­
ment er's actions nor any of the three who found other 
irrelevant cues for behavioral guides were in Group IV.
Group IV was informed that there was a problem to solve and 
that a red light would indicate a correct response.
In this particular experiment, there seems to be no 
way in which to control the perception of false cues in the 
figures. These cues were not physically real and so could 
be said to have been created by the subjects. However, the 
experimenter could have observed the subjects through a 
one-way mirror. With this procedure more subjects in 
Group III would possibly have recognized the red light as 
a reinforcement or have pushed the button by the triangle 
more often.
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The utilization of false cues seems to be related to 
the tendency of a significant number of subjects to state 
solutions for problems when no problems were posed externally 
by the instructions. Harlow, Harlow, and Meyer (1950) 
demonstrated a similar phenomenon with monkeys that were 
exposed to a puzzle lock. The experimental group was given 
the puzzle locked. The control group received the solved 
puzzle. The experimental group worked with the puzzle and 
learned how to unlock it. Throughout l4 days of observation, 
they showed no decrease in the amount they worked with the 
puzzle. The controls did not pay as much attention to the 
lock. There was no extrinsic reward given to either group.
No analogous research with humans has been reported. 
However, research has been done to study self-reinforcement 
in situations where correct behaviors were not externally 
reinforced. Johnston (1955) used a maze problem to demon­
strate the superior performance of subjects rated to have 
high achievement imagery as compared to those rated as low. 
Davis and Hess (1962) used an anagram task to investigate 
the relation of levels of awareness to learning. The 
difference in the present study is that there was no 
problem inherent in the task presented to GLroups I and II.
Harlow, Harlow, and Meyer (1950) concluded from the 
behavior of their monkeys that they had demonstrated the 
learning process motivated by a manipulation drive. Other 
authors have alluded to behavior that is not externally or 
physiologically motivated. Seward (1963) spoke of
47
effectance as a motive for activity that is intrinsically 
rewarding. White (1959) defined effectance as the element 
that activates behavior directed toward the goal of compe­
tence. Competence includes all motives that are not 
accounted for experimentally as being derived from 
homeostatic needs such as exploration, activity, manipu­
lation, mastery, sense of industry or achievement, motility, 
excitement, and novelty. Ryan (1958) included task as an 
essential part of motivation. Task is "a directly observable 
part of our experience. It is the answer to such questions 
as 'What are you doing?', 'What are you trying to do?',
'Where are you going?', 'What for?'" (p. ?8), and "State 
why you chose the buttons you did."
Harlow (1953) cited laboratory situations in which 
learning was observed to occur without the reduction of any 
drive. According to him, organisms from rodents to humans 
engage in what he called exploratory behavior motivated by 
what he called curiosity. This experiment provided no basis 
for applying Harlow's terminology to the behavior of the 
present subjects in Groups X and II. The equipment used 
could provide such a study by using the conditions that the 
two control groups were exposed to and then placing discs 
programmed with real problems in the problem box for the 
same subjects. Such a technique would provide a comparison 
of the performances of those subjects who respond randomly 
and those who do not.
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The phenomenon of the subjects creating their own 
problems for which they created their own solutions which 
they reinforced themselves might well be a "so what" finding. 
However, further research is suggested that could have 
important meaning for structuring learning situations. One 
question is how such subjects would subsequently perform on 
solving a real problem after establishing a behavior pattern 
that has been internally reinforced. Comparison could also 
be made of the subjects who responded randomly and those 
who did not on ability to solve other types of problems 
such as anagrams, mazes, or sentence construction. If 
differences were demonstrated, then investigations to 
identify related personality variables would be in order.
Group III did not yield adequate data for a defi­
nitive resolution of the issue of the relationship of 
verbalization to learning. The statistical analysis indica­
ted that there was no difference in the performance of the 
verbalizers and non-verbalizers. But Group III did not 
perform better than the control groups, so they could not 
be said to have performed better than chance. Considera­
tion must be given to the idea that the method of counting 
correct responses was not adequate to determine learning. 
Further trials without reinforcement would give information 
of the extinction of a learned behavior. A retest to 
measure retention would provide an additional measure of 
learning. There have been few attempts to measure retention 
such as those by Manis and Barnes (I961) and Sassenrath
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(1962). The time lapses they introduced were short--no more 
than an hour.
The facilitation effect on learning of increased 
information which was demonstrated in this study supports 
the findings of Postman and Jarrett (1952). Their research 
was a refutation of that done by Irwin, Kauffman, Prior, 
and Weaver (1934), who found that subjects who were informed 
as to the purpose and correct principles involved performed 
no better than uninformed subjects. Further research to 
measure retention would be desirable, since both educators 
and therapists are more interested in permanent changes in 
behavior than they are in the speed with which such changes 
are made.
From the data of this study no statement can be made 
in support or rejection of the hypothesis that learning 
cannot occur when the subject does not verbalize the rein­
forcement contingency. The relationships of learning per­
formance to the amount of prompting needed to elicit verbali­
zation of the reinforcement contingency and of performance 
to the subject's emotional reaction to the reinforcement 
were not testable. Learning was demonstrated to occur more 
efficiently when the problem and reinforcement were stated 
by the experimenter. Many subjects formulated problems and 
solutions when no problem was stated, but this phenomenon 
was not affected by the presence of a stimulus that was 
intended to represent reinforcement. This study suggests 
that complete information and unambiguous reinforcement 
provide the best conditions for learning.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY
The effects of various conditions of reinforcement 
and various amounts of information on learning and verbali­
zation of what was learned and why were investigated.
Emphasis was placed on avoiding inferences of awareness made 
from the verbalizations of the subjects. The intent was to 
direct attention to the phenomenon of verbalization as a 
factor involved in changing or controlling or learning 
behavior. Efforts were made to provide as simple and neutral 
situation as possible. Stimuli were selected with the 
belief that all subjects would have had similar experiences 
with them and that they would be free of emotional meaning.
Teska's problem box, which was used to present the  ̂
task, contains a screen with equal quadrants on which combi­
nations of a square, a triangle, and two blank spaces were 
illuminated. A button is placed adjacent to each quadrant. 
Discs containing 20 combinations each were programmed so a 
red light above the screen turned on when a specified 
button was pushed. Pushing a button also activates the 
mechanism that brings the next combination onto the screen.
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Sixty-six undergraduate students at the University 
of Oklahoma volunteered to be subjects. They were assigned 
to two control groups and two experimental groups. Control 
Group I could not turn on the red light with any button. 
Control Group II turned the light on each time they pushed 
a button. Experimental Groups III and IV turned on the 
light when they pushed the button by the triangle. Groups 
I, II, and III were instructed to push any buttons they 
wished, and no problem was introduced in the instructions. 
Group IV was told that they were to solve a problem and 
that each time a correct response was made the red light 
would go on. Each subject was given 60 trials.
When each subject completed the trials, he was given 
a questionnaire to determine why he was responding as he 
did, what cues he was utilizing, and the effect of the red 
light. Learning was measured by the number of times the 
button by the triangle was pushed. Comparisons of the 
learning by the groups were made with ' s for small
populations.
Group IV learned significantly better than the other 
groups. Within Group III, there was no significant differ­
ence in the performances of those subjects who verbalized 
that the red light was related to pushing the correct button 
and those who did not verbalize the reinforcement contin­
gency. However, the learning performance of Group III did 
not differ significantly from that of the control groups.
Of the 50 subjects for whom no problem was externally stated
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34 verbalized that they did not behave randomly. This pro­
portion was significantly different from chance. The red 
light had no effect on this tendency, since Groups I, II, 
and III did not differ significantly in this respect. The 
red light had differential meanings to the subjects, but 
there was no identifiable relation between the meaning and 
performance. The triangle, square, and blank spaces, also, 
were not perceived with the same feelings by all subjects. 
Further, subjects found cues in the situation that were not 
inherent in the stimuli.
The study suggested refinements that might be made 
in future research. The experiment demonstrated the 
phenomenon of subjects creating problems, solving them, 
and reinforcing the solutions themselves. The process 
seems worthy of investigation to determine if it hampers 
or facilitates learning and if it is related to personality 
variables. Learning occurred most efficiently when the 
problem was explicitly stated and when the reinforcement 
was clearly identified.
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23 49 X X
27 13 X X
31 10
35 38 X X
39 0 X
43 14 X


















8 49 X X X
12 52 X X X
16 60 X X X
20 59 X X X
24 58 X X X
28 58 X X X
32 50 X X X
36 58 X X X
40 57 X X X
44 41 X X X
48 48 X X X
52 59 X X X
56 58 X X X
60 56 X X X
64 32 X X X
Total 809 16 15 15
Mean 50
